Ibnu Miskawaih, Bapa Etika Islam

ETIKA ISLAM

• Guru ketiga setelah al-Farabi. Gelar itu ditabalkan kepada Ibnu Miskawaih, seorang ilmuwan agung kelahirkan Ray, Persia (sekarang Iran) sekitar tahun 320 H/932 M. Ia merupakan seorang ilmuwan hebat, bahkan ia juga dikenal sebagai seorang filsuf, penyair, dan sejarawan yang sangat terkenal.Ia terlahir pada era kejayaan Kekhalifahan Abbasiyyah.

• Ibnu Maskawaih adalah seorang keturunan Persia, yang konon dulunya keluarganya dan dia beragama Majuzi dan pindah ke dalam Islam. Ibnu Maskawaih berbeda dengan al-Kindi dan al-Farabi yang lebih menekankan pada aspek metafisik, ibnu Maskawaih lebih pada tataran filsafat etika seperti al-Ghazali.Sejarah dan filsafat merupakan dua bidang yang sangat disenanginya.

• Sejak masih muda, ia dengan tekun mempelajari sejarah dan filsafat, serta pernah menjadi pustakawan Ibnu al-‘Abid, tempat dia menuntut ilmu dan memperoleh banyak hal positif berkat pergaulannya dengan kaum elit. Tak hanya itu, Ibnu Miskawaih juga merupakan seorang yang aktif dalam dunia politik di era kekuasaan Dinasti Buwaih, di Baghdad. Ibnu Miskawaih meninggalkan Ray menuju Baghdad dan mengabdi kepada istana Pangeran Buwaih sebagai bendaharawan dan beberapa jabatan lain. Dia mengkombinasikan karier politik dengan peraturan filsafat yang penting. Tak hanya di kantor Buwaiah di Baghdad, ia juga mengabdi di Isfahan dan Rayy. Akhir hidupnya banyak dicurahkannya untuk studi dan menulis.

• Ibnu Miskawaih lebih dikenal sebagai filsuf akhlak (etika) walaupun perhatiannya luas meliputi ilmu-ilmu yang lain seperti kedokteran, bahasa, sastra, dan sejarah. Bahkan dalam literatur filsafat Islam, tampaknya hanya Ibnu Miskawaih inilah satu-satunya tokoh filsafat akhlak.Semasa hidupnya, ia merupakan anggota kelompok intelektual terkenal seperti al-Tawhidi and al-Sijistani. Sayangnya ia harus menghembuskan nafas terakhirnya di Asfahan 9 Safar 421 H (16 Februari 1030 M).Menurut Muhammad Hamidullah dan Afzal Iqbal dalam karyanya bertajuk The Emergence of Islam: Lectures on the Development of Islamic World-view, Intellectual Tradition and Polity, menjelaskan bahwa Ibnu Miskawaih merupakan orang pertama yang memaparkan secara jelas ide tentang evolusi.

• Seperti ilmuwan lainnya pada era abad ke-4 H dan ke-5 H (abad ke-10 M dan ke-11 M) Ibnu Miskawaih merupakan orang yang memiliki wawasan luas dalam bidang filosofi, berdasarkan pada pendekatannya terhadap filsafat Yunani yang telah diterjemahkan ke dalam bahasa Arab.Walaupun filosofi yang diterapkannya khusus untuk masalah-masalah Islam, ia jarang menggunakan agama untuk mengubah filosofi, dan selanjutnya dikenal sebagai seorang humanis Islam. Dia menunjukkan kecenderungan dalam filsafat Islam untuk menyesuaikan Islam kedalam sistem praktik rasional yang lebih luas umum bagi semua manusia.

• Neoplatonism Ibnu Miskawah memiliki dua sisi yakni praktik dan teori. Dia memberikan peraturan untuk kelestarian kesehatan moral berdasarkan pandangan budidaya karakter. Ini menjelaskan cara di mana berbagai bagian jiwa dapat dibawa bersama ke dalam harmoni, sehingga mencapai kebahagiaan.Ini adalah peran filsuf moral untuk menetapkan aturan untuk kesehatan moral, seperti dokter menetapkan aturan untuk kesehatan fisik.

• Kesehatan moral didasarkan pada kombinasi pengembangan intelektual dan tindakan praktis.Ibnu Miskawaih menggunakan metode eklektik dalam menyusun filsafatnya, yaitu dengan memadukan berbagai pemikiran-pemikiran sebelumnya dari Plato, Aristoteles, Plotinus, dan doktrin Islam. Namun karena inilah mungkin yang membuat filsafatnya kurang orisinal. Dalam bidang-bidang berikut ini tampak bahwa Ibnu Miskawayh hanya mengambil dari pemikiran-pemikiran yang sudah dikembangkan sebelumnya oleh filsuf lain.

• Ibnu Miskawaih menulis dalam berbagai topik yang luas, berkisar sejarah psikologi dan kimia, tapi dalam filsafat metafisikanya tampaknya secara umum telah diinformasikan oleh versi Neoplatonism. Dia menghindari masalah merekonsiliasi agama dengan filsafat dengan klaim dari filsuf Yunani yang tidak menayangkan fokus kesatuan dan keberadaan Allah.Menurut Ibnu Miskawaih, Tuhan merupakan zat yang tidak berjisim, azali, dan pencipta. Tuhan adalah esa dalam segala aspek, tidak terbagi-bagi dan tidak ada sesuatu pun yang setara dengan-Nya. Tuhan ada tanpa diadakan dan ada-Nya tidak tergantung pada yang lain, sedangkan yang lain membutuhkannya. Tuhan dapat dikenal dengan proposisi negatif karena memakai proposisi positif berarti menyamakan-Nya dengan alam.

• Ibnu Miskawaih menganut paham Neo-Platonisme tentang penciptaan alam oleh Tuhan. Ibnu Miskawaih menjelaskan bahwa entitas pertama yang memancar dari Tuhan adalah ‘aql fa’al (akal aktif). Akal aktif ini bersifat kekal, sempurna, dan tidak berubah. Dari akal ini timbul jiwa dan dengan perantaraan jiwa timbul planet (al-falak). Pancaran yang terus-menerus dari Tuhan dapat memelihara tatanan di alam ini, menghasilkan materi-materi baru. Sekiranya pancaran Tuhan yang dimaksud berhenti, maka berakhirlah kehidupan dunia ini.Kitab Taharat al-A'raq merupakan karya yang paling tinggi dan menunjukkan fakta-fakta kompleksitas yang konseptual sekali.

• Dalam karyanya itu, ia menetapkan untuk menunjukkan bagaimana kita dapat mungkin memperoleh watak yang baik untuk melakukan tindakan yang benar dan terorganisir serta sistematis.Menurut Ibnu Miskawaih, jiwa adalah abadi dan substansi bebas yang mengendalikan tubuh. Itu intisari berlawanan pada tubuh, sehingga tidak mati karena terlibat dalam satu gerakan lingkaran dan gerakan abadi, direplikasi oleh organisasi dari surga. Gerakan ini berlangsung dua arah, baik menuju alasan ke atas dan akal yang aktif atau terhadap masalah kebawah. Kebahagiaan kami timbul melalui gerakan keatas, kemalangan kami melalui gerakan dalam arah berlawanan.

• Pembahasan Ibnu Miskawaih tentang kebaikan dengan menggabungkan ide Aristoteles dengan Platonic. Menurut dia, kebaikan merupakan penyempurnaan dari aspek jiwa (yakni, alasan manusia) yang merupakan inti dari kemanusiaan dan membedakan dari bentuk keberadaan rendah.

• Bapak Etika Islam

• Ibnu Miskawaih dikenal sebagai bapak etika Islam. Ia telah telah merumuskan dasar-dasar etika di dalam kitabnya Tahdzib al-Akhlaq wa Tathir al-A’raq (pendidikan budi dan pembersihan akhlaq). Sementara itu sumber filsafat etika ibnu Miskawaih berasal dari filsafat Yunani, peradaban Persia, ajaran Syariat Islam, dan pengalaman pribadi.Menurut Ibnu Miskawaih, akhlak merupakan bentuk jamak dari khuluq yang berarti peri keadaan jiwa yang mengajak seseorang untuk melakukan perbuatan-perbuatan tanpa difikirkan dan diperhitungkan sebelumnya.

• Sehingga dapat dijadikan fitrah manusia maupun hasil dari latihan-latihan yang telah dilakukan, hingga menjadi sifat diri yang dapat melahirkan khuluq yang baik.Kata dia, ada kalanya manusia mengalami perubahan khuluq sehingga dibutuhkan aturan-aturan syariat, nasihat, dan ajaran-ajaran tradisi terkait sopan santun.

• Ibnu Maskawaih memperhatikan pula proses pendidikan akhlaq pada anak. Dalam pandangannya, kejiwaan anak-anak seperti mata rantai dari jiwa kebinatangan dan jiwa manusia yang berakal. Menurut dia, jiwa anak-anak itu menghilangkan jiwa binatang tersebut dan memunculkan jiwa kemanusiaannnya. ''Jiwa manusia pada anak-anak mengalami proses perkembangan. Sementara itu syarat utama kehidupan anak-anak adalah syarat kejiawaan dan syarat sosial,'' ungkap Ibnu Miskawaih. Sementara nilai-nilai keutamaan yang harus menjadi perhatian ialah pada aspek jasmani dan rohani.

• Ia pun mengharuskan keutamaan pergaulan anak-anak pada sesamanya mestilah ditanamkan sifat kejujuran, qonaah, pemurah, suka mengalah, mngutamakan kepentingan orang lain, rasa wajib taat, menghormati kedua orang tua, serta sikap positif lainnya.Ibnu Maskawaih membedakan antara al-Khair (kebaikan), dan as-sa’adah (kebahagiaan). Beliau mengambil alih konsep kebaikan mutlak dari Aristoteles, yang akan mengantarkan manusia pada kebahagiaan sejati.

• Menurutnya kebahagiaan tertinggi adalah kebijaksanaan yang menghimpun dua aspek; aspek teoritis yang bersumber pada selalu berfikir pada hakekat wujud dan aspek praktis yang berupa keutamaan jiwa yang melahirkan perbuatan baik. Dalam menempuh perjalananannya meraih kebahagiaan tertinggi tersebut manusia hendaklah selalu berpegangan pada nilai-nilai syariat, sebagai petunjuk jalan mereka.

• Ia berpendapat jiwa manusia terdiri atas tiga tingkatan, yakni nafsu kebinatangan, nafsu binatang buas, dan jiwa yang cerdas. ''Setiap manusia memiliki potensi asal yang baik dan tidak akan berubah menjadi jahat, begitu pula manusia yang memiliki potensi asal jahat sama sekali tidak akan cenderung kepada kebajikan, adapun mereka yang yang bukan berasal dari keduanya maka golongan ini dapat beralih pada kebajikan atau kejahatan, tergantung dengan pola pendidikan, pengajaran dan pergaulan.''

AL-GHAZALI DAN JIWA MANUSIA

• Dalam sejarah pemikiran filsafat dan keagamaan Islam Al-Ghazali menempati kedudukan yang sangat unik, karena pertimbangan kedalaman pengetahuannya, originiliti dan pengaruh pemikirannya. Sehingga ia dijuluki the proof of Islam (hujjat al-Islam), the ornament of faith (zain al-din), dan the renewer of religion (mujaddid). Juga dalam dirinya terkumpul hampir semua jenis pemikiran dari berbagai gerakan intelektual dan keagamaan. Maka, tidaklah menghairankan jika dia terkenal sebagai seorang pakar dalam berbagai disiplin ilmu seperti teologi, fikih, filsafat, dan tasawuf.Al-Ghazali selalu memberi wacana dan pemikirannya dalam berbagai disiplin ilmu. Karena pada masa kecilnya, ia sangat antusias mempelajari ilmu. Ia yang lahir tahun 450 H/1058 M di daerah Thus, dekat kota modern Meshed Khurasa, Persia (Irak). Distrik kota Thusi adalah tempat kelahiran banyak ulama menonjol dan orang terpelajar dalam Islam. Sehingga sangat wajar ketika Al-Ghazali merupakan sosok orang yang mengerti berbagai disiplin ilmu. Juga melihat karya-karyanya sekarang ini masih dipelajari dan dikaji.Dari berbagai bidang keilmuan, ia sangat mendalami ilmu tasawuf dibanding dengan ilmu filsafat. Kerana sebenarnya ia sangat kontradiktif terhadap ilmu yang rasional.

• Dalam bidang filsafat, Al-Ghazali mengecam kecenderungan filosofis karena ajaran-ajaran filosof cenderung membahayakan akidah dan mengabaikan dasar-dasar ritual. Namun, Al-Ghazali tidak menolak filsafat secara keseluruhan, tetapi yang ditolak hanya argumentasi rasional yang diyakini satu-satunya alat untuk membuktikan kebenaran metafisik. Para filosof sangat memaksakan rasio, bahkan apabila perlu mengabaikan akidah. Hal ini yang menyebabkan Al-Ghazali meninggalkan filsafat .Dalam kajian tasawuf, ia mempelajari jiwa. Karena ia merasakan pada dirinya ada sesuatu yang melekat. Hal ini menimbulkan bahwa esensi manusia ada berbagai unsur yang masuk dalam epistemologi.

• Dalam literatur ilmu kedokteran, sangat jauh berbeza dengan yang dipelajari Al-Ghazali. Konsep tentang jiwa memang cukup sulit untuk difahami dan dijelaskan dengan sebuah pengertian secara epistemologis yang dikemukakan para ahli ilmu jiwa sehingga banyak menimbulkan persepsi yang berbeza karena jiwa mempunyai hubungan yang kompleks dengan konsep lainnya seperti jasad, ruh, akal, dan kalbu. Jiwa merupakan substansi yang berdiri sendiri dan mempunyai sifat-sifat dasar yang berbeza dengan badan.Jiwa dan badan terdiri dari dua dunia yang berbeza, jiwa berasal dari dunia metafisik, bersifat imaterial, tidak berbentuk komposisi, mengandung daya mengetahui yang bergerak dan kekal. Sedangkan badan merupakan substansi yang berasal dari dunia fisik, bersifat materi, berbentuk komposisi tidak mengandung daya-daya dan tidak kekal.

• Jiwa merupakan sub sistem jiwa (nafs) yang di dalamnya terdiri dari ruh, akal, dan kalbu yang semua itu merupakan daya-daya penggerak dan dapat memengaruhi gerak badan.Hubungan antara jiwa, badan dan gerak tingkah laku manusia mempunyai dua hubungan wujud dan aktivitas. Hubungan wujud jiwa dan badan merupakan hubungan yang saling membutuhkan karena jiwa diciptakan bukan karena badan dan jiwa bukan berada dalam badan. Maka, jiwa merupakan substansi material karena jiwa menempati sebuah bagian. Jadi hubungan keduanya bersifat horizontal transendental dan pada akhirnya hubungan keduanya akan terputus dan pada saat tertentu jiwa dan badan bisa kembali seperti semula dan proses kejadian semula.

• Sekali lagi, Al-Ghazali memandang eksistensi jiwa adalah suatu yang utuh. Ia mendukung doktrin-doktrin yang menyatakan bahwa pusat pengalaman manusia tertumpu pada jiwanya yang merupakan substansi yang berdiri sendiri karena jiwa itu mempunyai fungsi dan fakultas-fakultas. Jiwa manusia tidak terkotak secara terpisah, melainkan menyebar ke seluruh organ tubuh. Jiwa manusia terdiri atas substansi yang mempunyai dimensi dan kemampuan merasa untuk bergerak dengan yakin berupa potensi dasar yang dimiliki jiwa.Melihat secara sufistik, Al-Ghazali membagi beberapa tingkatan kejiwaan.

• Pertama, jiwa yang tenang (an-nafs al-mutmainnah) adalah jiwa yang berada pada perkembangan jiwa tatkala mendapatkan ketenteraman dan kedamaian karena Tuhan. Al-Ghazali juga mengutip Al-Quran untuk memperkuat pendapatnya "wahai jiwa yang muthma'innah kembalilah ke dalam Tuhanmu, dalam keadaan ridha dan diridhai sepenuhnya." Karakter jiwa ini akan menemukan ketenangan dan ketenteraman jika terhindar dari godaan-godaan yang mengganggunya.

• Kedua, jiwa yang penuh penyesalan (an-nafs al-lawwah) adalah mencela. Secara lughawi, istilah al-lawwamah mengandung arti amat mencela dirinya sendiri. Jiwa ini termasuk jiwa yang menyedari fikiran-fikiran, keinginan dan cela diri sendiri. Pada taraf jiwa ini merupakan awal taraf rohani kerana pada taraf ini merupakan sebuah proses kembali pada Tuhan dan proses penghilangan pelanggaran. Jadi, taraf ini ada proses dalam pencarian Tuhan, di mana ada sesuatu yang menghendaki batinnya antara kecocokan yang mereka peroleh.

• Ketiga, jiwa yang memerintah (an-nafs al-'amarah) pada taraf ini termasuk jiwa yang belum dimurnikan atau dibersihkan dari sumber segala jenis perbuatan untuk memenuhi perbuatan-perbuatan dengan semua yang merupakan kemurkaan (ghadlab) dan keinginan (syahwah) untuk menguasai jiwa. Juga disebutkan dalam ayat Al-Quran surat Yusuf ayat 12:53: "Dan aku tidak membebaskan diriku dari kesalahan, karena sesungguhnya jiwa itu selalu menyuruh kepada kejahatan, kecuali jiwa yang diberi rahmat oleh Tuhanku. Sesungguhnya Tuhanku Maha Pengampun lagi Maha Penyayang.”

EPISTEMOLOGY IN ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY

• Muslim philosophers agree that knowledge is possible. Knowledge is the intellect's grasp of the immaterial forms, the pure essences or universals that constitute the natures of things, and human happiness is achieved only through the intellect's grasp of such universals. They stress that for knowledge of the immaterial forms, the human intellect generally relies on the senses. Some philosophers, such as Ibn Rushd and occasionally Ibn Sina, assert that it is the material forms themselves, which the senses provide, that are grasped by the intellect after being stripped of their materiality with the help of the divine world. However, the general view as expressed by al-Farabi and Ibn Sina seems to be that the material forms only prepare the way for the reception of the immaterial forms, which are then provided by the divine world. They also state that on rare occasions the divine world simply bestows the immaterial forms on the human intellect without any help from the senses. This occurrence is known as prophecy. While all Muslim philosophers agree that grasping eternal entities ensures happiness, they differ as to whether such grasping is also necessary for eternal existence.

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  1. Nature of knowledge

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  Muslim philosophers are primarily concerned with human happiness and its attainment. Regardless of what they consider this happiness to be, all agree that the only way to attain it is through knowledge. The theory of knowledge, epistemology, has therefore been their main preoccupation and appears chiefly in their logical and psychological writings. Epistemology concerns itself primarily with the possibility, nature and sources of knowledge. Taking the possibility of knowledge for granted, Muslim philosophers focused their epistemological effort on the study of the nature and sources of knowledge. Their intellectual inquiries, beginning with logic and ending with metaphysics and in some cases mysticism, were in the main directed towards helping to understand what knowledge is and how it comes about.

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  Following in the footsteps of the Greek philosophers, Muslim philosophers consider knowledge to be the grasping of the immaterial forms, natures, essences or realities of things. They are agreed that the forms of things are either material (that is, existing in matter) or immaterial (existing in themselves). While the latter can be known as such, the former cannot be known unless first detached from their materiality. Once in the mind, the pure forms act as the pillars of knowledge. The mind constructs objects from these forms, and with these objects it makes judgments. Thus Muslim philosophers, like Aristotle before them, divided knowledge in the human mind into conception (tasawwur), apprehension of an object with no judgment, and assent (tasdiq), apprehension of an object with a judgment, the latter being, according to them, a mental relation of correspondence between the concept and the object for which it stands. Conceptions are the main pillars of assent; without conception, one cannot have a judgment. In itself, conception is not subject to truth and falsity, but assent is. However, it should be pointed out that tasdiq is a misleading term in Islamic philosophy. It is generally used in the sense of 'accepting truth or falsity', but also occasionally in the sense of 'accepting truth'. One must keep in mind, however, that when assent is said to be a form of knowledge, the word is then used, not in the broad sense to mean true or false judgment, but in the narrow sense to mean true judgment.

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  In Islamic philosophy, conceptions are in the main divided into the known and the unknown. The former are grasped by the mind actually, the latter potentially. Known conceptions are either self-evident (that is, objects known to normal human minds with immediacy such as 'being', 'thing' and 'necessary') or acquired (that is, objects known through mediation, such as 'triangle'). With the exception of the self-evident conceptions, conceptions are known or unknown relative to individual minds. Similarly, Muslim philosophers divided assent into the known and the unknown, and the known assent into the self-evident and the acquired. The self-evident assent is exemplified by 'the whole is greater than the part', and the acquired by 'the world is composite'. In Kitab At-Tanbih Ala Sabil As-Saada, Al-Farabi calls the self-evident objects: 'the customary, primary, well-known knowledge, which one may deny with one's tongue, but which one cannot deny with one's mind since it is impossible to think their contrary'. Of the objects of conception and assent, only the unknown ones are subject to inquiry. By reducing the number of unknown objects one can increase knowledge and provide the chance for happiness. But how does such reduction come about?

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  2. Sources of knowledge

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  In Islamic philosophy there are two theories about the manner in which the number of unknown objects is reduced. One theory stresses that this reduction is brought about by moving from known objects to unknown ones, the other that it is merely the result of direct illumination given by the divine world. The former is the upward or philosophical way, the second the downward or prophetic one. According to the former theory, movement from the known objects of conception to the unknown ones can be effected chiefly through the explanatory phrase (al-qawl ash-sharih). The proof (al-burhan) is the method for moving from the known objects of assent to the unknown ones. The explanatory phrase and proof can be either valid or invalid: the former leads to certitude, the latter to falsehood. The validity and invalidity of the explanatory phrase and proof can be determined by logic, which is a set of rules for such determination. Ibn Sina points out that logic is a necessary key to knowledge and cannot be replaced except by God's guidance, as opposed to other types of rules such as grammar for discourse (which can be replaced by a good natural mind) and metre for poetry (which can be replaced by good taste).

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  By distinguishing the valid from the invalid explanatory phrase and proof, logic serves a higher purpose, namely that of disclosing the natures or essences of things. It does this because conceptions reflect the realities or natures of things and are the cornerstones of the explanatory phrase and proof. Because logic deals only with expressions that correspond to conceptions, when it distinguishes the valid from the invalid it distinguishes at the same time the realities or natures of things from their opposites. Thus logic is described as the key to the knowledge of the natures of things. This knowledge is described as the key to happiness; hence the special status of logic in Islamic philosophy.

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  3. Logic and knowledge

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  We are told that because logic deals only with the known and unknown, it cannot deal with anything outside the mind. Because it is a linguistic instrument (foreign in nature to the realities of things), it cannot deal with such realities directly, whether they exist in the mind or outside it, or are external to these two realms of existence. It can only deal with the states or accidents of such realities, these states comprising links among the realities and intermediaries between the realities and language. Logic therefore deals with the states of such realities, as they exist in the mind. Such states are exemplified by 'subject' or 'predicate', 'universality' or 'particularity', 'essentiality' or 'accidentality'. In other words, logic can deal with realities only in that these realities are subjects or predicates, universal or particular, essential or accidental and so on.

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  Because the ultimate human objective is the understanding of the realities, essences or natures of things, and because the ultimate logical objective is the understanding of conceptions, logicians must focus on the understanding of those conceptions that lead to the understanding of the essences if they intend to serve humanity. Ibn Sina points out that since the essences are universal, such expressions are also universal in the sense of representing universal conceptions such as 'human being', not in the sense of being universal only in expression, such as 'Zayd'. A universal expression can be applied to more than one thing, as the last two examples show, but one must keep in mind Ibn Sina's distinction between these two types of universal expressions: the former represents reality, although indirectly, the latter does not. It is only the former with which the logician should be concerned.

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  Considering that the discussion of universals occupies a central place in Arabic logic, it is important to focus briefly on this subject to ensure understanding of the proper objects of the knowledge of the natures of things. Muslim philosophers divide universal expressions into five types, known together as the five predicables: genus, species, difference, property and common accident. Genus refers to the common nature of all the species that fall under it, such as 'animality' for 'human being', 'dog', 'cat' and so on. As such, it tells us what the general nature of a thing is. Species refers to the common nature of all the individuals that fall under it, such as 'human being' for 'John', 'George' and 'Dorothy'. As such, it tells us what the specific nature of a thing is. Difference refers to that which differentiates the members of the genus, such as 'rational', which differentiates the species of being human from other animal species; it tells us which thing a being is. These three universals are essential to a thing; that is, without them the essence will not be what it is. Property and common accident are accidental, in that they attach to the thing but are not part of its essence. Property refers to something that necessarily attaches to one universal only, such as 'capacity for laughter' for 'human being'. Common accident refers to a quality that attaches to more than one universal, either in an inseparable manner, such as 'black' for 'crow', or in a separable manner, such as 'black' for 'human being'. The inseparability of the common accident, however, is only in existence.

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  Only the first three of the above universals constitute the essences of things. If one is to understand the essence of a thing, one must first understand its genus, species and difference or differences. The understanding of these three universals takes place through the explanatory phrase and proof, of which these universals are simple elements. The explanatory phrase is either definition or description. The definition is a phrase which mirrors the essence of a thing by indicating its general and specific essential qualities, that is, its genus, species and difference; the description is like the definition except that it indicates the property instead of the difference. Thus the description does not give a complete picture of the essence of a thing as does the definition. The proof is a set of propositions, which consist of conceptions joined or separated by particles. The proof that helps in the understanding of the essences of things is that which moves from known universal judgments to an unknown universal one.

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  The important question that concerned Muslim philosophers is how the universals or forms that are essential to the natures of things arrive at the human mind before it has the chance to employ the explanatory phrase and proof to compose known conceptions and known judgments from them. In order to answer this question, Muslim philosophers first discussed the structure of the human soul and then the steps through which the universals pass on their way to the place of knowledge. As stated above, conceptions come to the mind through either the philosophical way or the prophetic way. The philosophical way requires one first to use one's external senses to grasp the universals as they exist in the external world, mixed with matter. Then the internal senses, which like the external senses are a part of the animal soul, take in these universals and purify them of matter as much as possible. The imagination is the highest internal sense, in which these universals settle until the next cognitive move. It is from this point to the next step in the philosophical journey that the details seem particularly unclear.

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  4. The role of the mind

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  All Muslim philosophers believe that above the senses there is the rational soul. This has two parts: the practical and theoretical intellects. The theoretical intellect is responsible for knowledge; the practical intellect concerns itself only with the proper management of the body through apprehension of particular things so that it can do the good and avoid the bad. All the major Muslim philosophers, beginning with Al-Kindi, wrote treatises on the nature and function of the theoretical intellect, which may be referred to as the house of knowledge.

• 
  In addition to the senses and the theoretical intellect, Muslim philosophers include in their discussion of the instruments of knowledge a third factor. They teach that the divine world contains, among other things, intelligences, the lowest of which is what al-Kindi calls the First Intellect (al-'aql al-awwal), better known in Arabic philosophy as the 'agent intellect' (al-'aql al-fa''al), the name given to it by Al-Farabi, or 'the giver of forms' (wahib as-suwar). They contend that the world around us is necessary for the attainment of philosophical knowledge. Some, such as Ibn Bajja, Ibn Rushd and occasionally Ibn Sina, say that the mixed universals in the imagination that have been derived from the outside world through the senses are eventually purified completely by the light of the agent intellect, and are then reflected onto the theoretical intellect.

• 
  Al-Farabi's and Ibn Sina's general view, however, is that these imagined universals only prepare the theoretical intellect for the reception of the universals from the agent intellect that already contains them. When expressing this view, Ibn Sina states that it is not the universals in the imagination themselves that are transmitted to the theoretical intellect but their shadow, which is created when the light of the agent intellect is shed on these universals. This is similar, he says, to the shadow of an object which is reflected on the eye when sunlight is cast on that object. While the manner in which the universals in the imagination can prepare the theoretical intellect for knowledge is in general unclear, it is vaguely remarked by al-Farabi and Ibn Sina that this preparation is due to the similarity of these universals to the pure universals, and to the familiarity of the theoretical intellect with the imagined universals owing to its proximity to the imagination. In other words, the familiarity of this intellect with what resembles its proper objects prepares it for the reception of these objects from the agent intellect.

• 
  5. Philosophical and prophetic knowledge

• 
  The prophetic way is a much easier and simpler path. One need not take any action to receive the divinely given universals; the only requirement seems to be the possession of a strong soul capable of receiving them. While the philosophical way moves from the imagination upward to the theoretical intellect, the prophetic way takes the reverse path, from the theoretical intellect to the imagination. For this reason, knowledge of philosophy is knowledge of the natures of things themselves, while knowledge of prophecy is knowledge of the natures of things as wrapped up in symbols, the shadows of the imagination.

• 
  Philosophical and prophetic truth is the same, but it is attained and expressed differently. Ibn Tufayl's Hayy Ibn Yaqzan is the best illustration of the harmony of philosophy and religion. The so-called double truth theory wrongly views these two paths to knowledge as two types of truth, thus attributing to Ibn Rushd a view foreign to Islamic philosophy. One of the most important contributions of Islamic philosophy is the attempt to reconcile Greek philosophy and Islam by accepting the philosophical and prophetic paths as leading to the same truth.

• 
  Muslim philosophers agree that knowledge in the theoretical intellect passes through stages. It moves from potentiality to actuality and from actuality to reflection on actuality, thus giving the theoretical intellect the respective names of potential intellect, actual intellect and acquired intellect. Some Muslim philosophers explain that the last is called 'acquired' because its knowledge comes to it from the outside, and so it can be said to acquire it. The acquired intellect is the highest human achievement, a holy state that conjoins the human and the divine realms by conjoining the theoretical and agent intellects.

• 
  Following in the footsteps of Alexander of Aphrodisias, al-Farabi, Ibn Bajja and Ibn Rushd believe that the theoretical intellect is potential by nature, and therefore disintegrates unless it grasps the eternal objects, the essential universals, for the known and the knower are one. Ibn Sina rejects the view that the theoretical intellect is potential by nature. He argues instead that it is eternal by nature because unless it is, it cannot grasp the eternal objects. For him, happiness is achieved by this intellect's grasping of the eternal objects, for such grasping perfects the soul. Muslim philosophers who believe that eternity is attained only through knowledge also agree with Ibn Sina that knowledge is perfection and perfection is happiness.

• 
  References and further reading
  Davidson, H.A. (1992) Al-Farabi, Avicenna and Averroes on Intellect, London: Oxford University Press. (Discusses the link between Greek and Arabic understanding of intellect and the various transformations the concept of intellect underwent in Islamic philosophy.)Fakhry, M. (ed.) (1992) Rasa'il Ibn Bajja al-ilahiyya (Ibn Bajja's Metaphysical Essays), Beirut: Dar al-Jil. (Includes the most important of Ibn Bajja's philosophical treatises, Tadbir al-mutawahhid (Management of the Solitary), Risalat al-ittisal al-'aql al-fa''al bil-insan (Essay on the Conjunction of the Intellect with Human Beings) and Risalat al-wada' (Essay on Bidding Farewell).)al-Farabi (c.870-950) Risala fi al-'aql (Essay on the Intellect), ed. M. Bouyges, Beirut: al-Maktab al-Katulikiyya, 1939. (One of the best known and most influential treatises on intellect in Islamic philosophy; it gives the different senses of 'intellect' known to al-Farabi.)* al-Farabi (c.870-950) Kitab at-tanbih 'ala sabil as-sa'ada (The Book of Remarks Concerning the Path of Happiness), ed. J. Al-Yasin, Beirut: Dar al-Manahil, 1985. (Includes al-Farabi's definition of the self-evident objects.)Ibn Rushd (1126-98) Talkhis kitab an-nafs (Epitome of Aristotle's On the Soul), ed. A.F. al-Ahwani, Cairo: Maktabat an-Nahda, 1950. (This edition also includes three other essays: Ibn Bajja's Risalat al-ittisal (Essay on Conjunction), Ishaq ibn Hunayn's Kitab fi an-nafs (Book on the Soul) and al-Kindi's Risalat al-'aql (Essay on Intellect).)Ibn Sina (980-1037) al-Shifa' (Healing), ed. F. Rahman, London: Oxford University Press, 1959. (Standard account by Ibn Sina of his views on the soul, including the essays at-Tabi'iyyat (Physics) and an-Nafs (Psychology).)Ibn Sina (980-1037) al-Isharat wa'l-tanbihat (Remarks and Admonitions), part translated by S.C. Inati, Remarks and Admonitions: Part One, Logic, Toronto: Pontifical Institute for Mediaeval Studies, 1984. (The most comprehensive of Ibn Sina's logic and best representation of Arabic logic.)* Ibn Tufayl (before 1185) Hayy Ibn Yaqzan (The Living Son of the Vigilant), ed. L. Gauthier, Beirut: Catholic Press, 1936; trans. L. Goodman, Ibn Tufayl's Hayy Ibn Yaqzan, A Philosophical Tale, New York: Twayne Publishers, 1972. (Expresses the harmony between reason and revelation in a literary form).Nuseibeh, S. (1996) 'Epistemology', in S.H. Nasr and O. Leaman (eds) History of Islamic Philosophy, London: Routledge, ch. 49, 824-40. (Analysis of the main concepts of epistemology, along with discussion of how some of the main thinkers take up different positions.)Rida, A. (ed.) (1950) Rasa'il al-Kindi al-falsafiyya (al-Kindi's Philosophical Essays), Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-'Arabi. (These two volumes include four essays relevant to al-Kindi's theory of knowledge: Risalat al-Kindi fi al-qawl fi an-nafs (Al-Kindi's Essay on the Discourse Concerning the Soul), Kalam lil-Kindi fi an-nafs (Words for al-Kindi Concerning the Soul), Risalat al-Kindi fi mahiyyat an-nawm war-ru'ya (Al-Kindi's Essay on Sleep and Vision) and Risalat al-Kindi fi al-'aql (Al-Kindi's Essay on the Intellect). The last of these is the best known and seems to have been the first in a long and influential series of Arabic works on the intellect.)Rosenthal, F. (1970) Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam, Leiden: Brill. (By far the best work on epistemology in Islamic thought, authoritative and always interesting.)

REZA

IBN AL-'ARABI AND HIS SCHOOL

IBNU ARABI - SHORE OF AN ENDLESS SEA

• Speaking about Ibnu Arabi, we now come to the shore of an endless sea, to the foot of a mountain whose summit is lost in the clouds: all these metaphors are appropriate to the gigantic scope of the work of Ibn al-'Arabi, one of the greatest visionary theosophers of all time. We must radically alter the false perspective, which stems from some unadmitted prejudice, according to which Ibn al-'Arabi's work signals the end of the golden age of Sufism. Far from this being the case, we may say that this work marks the beginning of something novel and original—so original that it could have occurred only at the heart of Abrahamic esotericism, and, of the three branches of this esotericism, only at the heart of the Islamic.

• The philosophy of the falasifa, the kalam of the scholastics, the asceticism of primitive pious Sufism—all these are swept away in a torrent of unprecedented speculative metaphysics and visionary power. This is the beginning of the 'golden age' of mystical theosophy. As is well known, Ibn al-'Arabi's theosophy and the 'Oriental' (ishraq) theosophy of al-Suhrawardi are related to each other.

• When both united with the Shiite theosophy deriving from the holy Imams, the result was the great flowering of Shiite metaphysics in Iran (with Haydar Amuli, Ibn Abi Jumhur, Mulla Sadra etc.) whose potential even today is far from being exhausted. Ibn al-'Arabi was born in south-eastern Spain, in Murcia, on the 17th Ramadan 569/28th July 1165. His formative years and the years of his apprenticeship were spent in Andalusia. At the age of seventeen, Ibn al-'Arabi had an extraordinary conversation with the philosopher Averroes. There was no further encounter between them until the day when the ashes of Averroes were transported to Cordoba. The young Ibn al-'Arabi was present at this occasion, and he composed some poignant distichs which presage the orientation that he was to give to Islamic philosophy and spirituality. He was strongly influenced in his formative years by Ibn Masarrah's school of Almeria, which propagated the teaching of Ismaili and Shiite missionaries. Later, when Mulla Sadra's school of Isfahan accepted the doctrines of Ibn al-'Arabi, the grandiose circuit of this return to the origins was completed. In the meantime, to remain in Andalusia was intolerable for anyone who wished to reject literalism. Ibn al-'Arabi decided to leave for the East, and undertook a voyage that for him possessed the value of a symbol.
  

• After an admirably full life and a prolific literary output, he died peacefully at Damascus, surrounded by his family, on the 28th Rabi' II 638/16th November 1240. He is buried there with his two sons on the side of Mount Qasiyun, and his tomb is still for many a place of pilgrimage. It is impossible to summarize the doctrines of Ibn al-'Arabi in a few lines. All we can do is to indicate very briefly some of the essential points.
  

• As in all gnosis, the keystone of the system, if the term is acceptable, is the mystery of a pure Essence which is unknowable, unpredictable, and ineffable. From this unfathomable Abyss the torrent of theophanies arises and proliferates, and the theory of the divine Names is born. Ibn al-'Arabi is in complete agreement about this with Ismaili and Twelver Shiite theosophy, both of which rigorously respect the rule and consequences of apophatic {tanzih) theology. Is there a breach between them in so far as Ibn al-'Arabi gives the name of Pure Light to this Ineffable Being, or identifies it with absolute Being, whereas Ismaili theosophy sees the source of being as strictly beyond being—as supra-being? Both interpretations result in a sense of the transcendent unity of being (wahdat al-wujud), which has been so widely misunderstood.
  

• The divine abyss conceals the mystery of the 'hidden Treasure' that aspires to be known, and that creates creatures in order to become in them the object of its own knowledge. This revelation of the divine Being is accomplished in the form of a succession of theophanies characterized by three stages: the epiphany of the divine Essence to itself, which can only be spoken of by allusion; a second theophany which is the sum total of all the theophanies in and through which the divine Essence reveals itself to itself in the forms of the divine Names—that is to say, in the forms of beings such as they exist in the secret of the absolute mystery; and a third theophany in the forms of concrete individuals, which bestows upon the divine Names a concrete and manifest existence. These Names exist from all eternity within the divine Essence, and are this very Essence, because the Attributes which they designate, although they are not identical with the divine Essence as such, are nevertheless not different from it. These Names are known as 'Lords' (arbab) who possess the appearance of so many hypostases.{We may recall the procession of the divine Names in the Hebrew Book of Enoch, or 'Third Enoch'.) In terms of actual experience, we can know these divine Names only through our knowledge of ourselves: God describes himself to us through us.
  

• In other words, the divine Names are essentially relative to the beings which name them, as these beings find and experience them in and through their own mode of being. This is why these Names are also designated as constitutive of the levels or planes of being (hadarat, nazarat, meaning presences or, as Ramon Llull translated it, 'dignities'). Seven of them are the Imams of the Names, and the others are known as the 'guardians of the temple' or templars {sadanah): the theory of the divine Names is modelled on the general theory of the hadarat. Thus the divine Names possess meaning and full reality only through and for the beings who are their epiphanic forms (mazahir). Equally, these forms which support the divine Names have existed in the divine Essence from all eternity; they are our own latent existences in their archetypal state,' eternal haecceities' (a 'yan thabita).
  

• It is these latent individualities which aspire from all eternity to be revealed: their yearning is that of the 'concealed Treasure' aspiring to be known. From this there eternally proceeds the 'Sigh of compassion' (al-Nafas al-Rahmani) which brings into active being the divine Names that are still unknown, and the existences through and for which these divine Names are made manifest in actuality. Thus in its hidden being, each existence is a breath of the divine existential Compassion, and the divine name Allah is the equivalent of the name al-Rahman, the Compassionate, the Merciful. This 'Sigh of compassion' is the origin of amass whose composition is wholly subtle, and which is known by the name of Cloud ('ama): a primordial Cloud which both receives all forms and bestows upon beings their forms, is both active and passive, constructive and receptive. Primordial Cloud, existential Compassion, active, absolute or theophanic Imagination—these words designate the same original reality, who is the created God (Haqq makhluq) by whom all creatures are created. He is the Creator-created, the Hidden-manifested, the Esoteric-exoteric, the First-last, and so on. It is through this Figure that esoteric theosophy in Islam can be situated on the level of the 'speculative theology' which we mentioned above in our general survey.
  

• The First-created (Makhluq awwal, Protoktistos) in the bosom of this primordial Cloud is the Muhammadan Logos, the metaphysical reality of the prophet (Haqiqah muhammadiyah, also called the Muhammadan Holy Spirit (Ruh muhammadi), the source and origin of a theology of the Logos and of the Spirit which reproduces, in the form appropriate to it, the theology of the neo-Platonists, of gnosis, of Philo and of Origen.
  

• The pair Creator-created (haqq-Khalq) is repeated at all levels of theophany and at all stages of the 'descent of being'. This is neither monism nor pantheism; rather, it can be called theomonism and panentheism. Theomonism is no more than the philosophical expression of the interdependence of Creator and created—interdependence, that is, on the level of theophany. This is the secret of the personal divinity (sirr al-rububiya), of the interdependence, that is, between the lord (rabb) and him who chooses him as his lord (marbub), to the extent that one cannot subsist without the other. The diety (uluhiya) is on the level of pure Essence; the rububiya is the divinity of the personal lord to whom one has recourse, because one answers for him in this world. Allah is the Name designating the divine Essence which is qualified by all its attributes, while the rabb or lord is the divine Being personified and particularized by one of his Names and Attributes. This is the whole secret of the divine Names and of what Ibn al-'Arabi calls 'the God created in beliefs', or rather the God who creates himself in these beliefs. This is why knowledge of God is limitless for the gnostic, since the recurrence of Creation and the metamorphoses of the theophanies are the law itself of being.
  

• In this brief summary we can only suggest, not systematize. Ibn al-'Arabi was an enormously prolific writer. As we know thanks to the exemplary labours of Osman Yahya, his works in all number eight hundred and fifty-six, of which five hundred and fifty have come down to us in the form of two thousand one hundred and seventeen manuscripts. His most famous masterpiece is the vast work of some three thousand large quarto pages entitled The Book of the Spiritual Conquests of Mecca (Kitab al-futuha tal-Makkiya), which is at present being edited for the first time by Osman Yahya. This work has been read throughout the centuries by all the philosophers and spiritual men of Islam. The same can be said of the collection entitled The Gems of the Wisdom of the Prophets (Fusus al-hikam), which is not so much a history of the prophets as a speculative meditation on twenty-seven of them, regarded as the archetypes of the divine Revelation. The work itself pertains to the 'phenomenon of the revealed Book', for Ibn al-'Arabi presents it as having been inspired from Heaven by the Prophet. Both Shiite and Sunni authors have written commentaries on it. Osman Yahya has compiled an inventory of one hundred and fifty of them, about a hundred and thirty of which are the work of Iranian spiritual men. These commentaries are not simply innocuous glosses, for although the work of Ibn al-'Arabi aroused fervent admiration among his followers, it also provoked passionate wrath and anathema among his adversaries.
  

• Among other famous commentaries on the Fusus, there is one by Da'ud al-Qaysari (751/1350-1351), a Sunni, and one by Kamal al-Din 'Abd al-Razzaq {died between 735/1334 and 751/ 1350-1351), a famous Shiite thinker, to whom we also owe a mystical commentary on the Quran, a treatise on the vocabulary of Sufism and a treatise on the futuwwah. Mention should also be made of the lengthy Shiite commentary by Haydar Amuli, which is in the process of being edited, and which includes a severe criticism of Da'ud al-Qaysari on a point which is decisive for all the philosophy of the walayah. Two questions arise: how is one to conceive of an integral history of Islamic philosophy before all these texts have been studied? And how long will it be before they have been studied?
  

• There can be no question here of even a brief outline of the history of Ibn al-'Arabi's school. But we must not omit to mention the name of Sadr al-Din al-Qunyawi (meaning from Quniyah or Konia or Iconium, often mistakenly transcribed as Qunawi). Sadr al-Din (671/1272 or 673/1273-1274) was both the disciple and the son-in-law of Ibn al-'Arabi, and his thought was steeped in Ibn al-'Arabi's doctrine. He wrote a number of important works. He is of great interest in that he himself in some sense represents a crossroads: he was in touch with Jalal al-Din Rumi and Sa'd al-Din Hamuyah (or Hamu'i), and corresponded with the great Shiite philosopher Nasir al-Din Tusi, as well as with other shaykhs. None of the texts necessary for an analysis of his thought has yet been edited.

REZA

SOALAN-SOALAN YANG SUKAR

Existence = Degrees Of Existences

Revolution = Concepts Of Existences
Action = Contexts Of Existences

Impact = Alternatives Of Existences

Guidance = Tools Of Existences

Limitation = Weapons Of Existences

Evolution = Laws Of Existences

Freedom = Desires Of Existences

Beberapa Persoalan:-

1.Bagaimanakah kita bisa mengetahui bahawa segala ilmu yang telah kita kuasai selama ini adalah BENAR?

2.Apakah rahsia-rahsia yang ada disebalik ilmu yang telah kita kuasai selama ini?

3.Apakah ilmu yang telah kita kuasai selama ini, telah memberikan kita keupayaan untuk membezakan antara perkara-perkara yang HAK dan BATIL?

4.Adakah kemungkinan bahawa segala ilmu yang telah kita kuasai selama ini adalah PALSU dan hanyalah REKAAN semata-mata?

5.Adakah dari sebab ilmu yang telah kita kuasai selama ini telah membuatkan kita gagal untuk memahami yang BENAR sebagai BENAR dan yang PALSU sebagai PALSU?

6.Bagaimanakah kita boleh menguji akan KEBENARAN ilmu kita?

7.Adakah hanya kerana kita telah berjaya mendapatkan sekeping ijazah daripada suatu universiti yang berprestij telah menjadikan kita seorang manusia yang "tahu akan segalanya"?

8.Apakah yang ada di langit?

9.Apakah yang ada di dalam bumi?

10.Apakah yang menjadi unsur-unsur diri kita dari sudut fizikal dan metafizikalnya?

11.Apakah diluar sana wujud manusia-manusia yang telah berjaya menguasai ilmu-ilmu yang membolehkan mereka melihat yang HAK sebagai HAK dan yang BATIL sebagai BATIL?

12.Bagaimanakah yang BATIL itu menukar bentuk kewujudannya sehingga kita melihatnya sebagai KEBENARAN?

13.Bagaimanakah yang HAK itu "di litupi ' sehingga kita gagal melihat KEBENARANNYA?

14.Apakah unsur-unsur yang menyelimuti kewujudan yang HAK sehingga kita gagal melihatnya?

15.Apakah kita diselimuti atau perkara yang HAK itu diselimuti?

16.Pernahkan kita terfikir soalan-soalan di atas?

ERTI HAKIKAT DAN ERTI MAKRIFAT

• Di dalam Ilmu Falsafah HAKIKAT dikenali sebagai ONTOLOGY manakala MAKRIFAT dikenali sebagai EPISTEMOLOGY. Istilah HAKIKAT dan MAKRIFAT adalah istilah-istilah yang diguna pakai oleh Ahli Sufi yang sekaligus merupakan Ahli Falsafah di zaman kegemilangan ilmu-ilmu Islam suatu masa dahulu.

• MAKNA ONTOLOGY

• Ontology (from the Greek ὦν, genitive ὄντος: of being and -λογία: science, study, theory) is the philosophical study of the nature of being, existence or reality in general, as well as of the basic categories of being and their relations. Traditionally listed as a part of the major branch of philosophy known as metaphysics, ontology deals with questions concerning what entities exist or can be said to exist, and how such entities can be grouped, related within a hierarchy, and subdivided according to similarities and differences.
  
  
• The principal questions of ontology are "What can be said to exist?" and "Into what categories, if any, can we sort existing things?" Various philosophers have provided different answers to this question.

• One common approach is to divide the extant entities into groups called categories. Of course, such lists of categories differ widely from one another, and it is through the co-ordination of different categorial schemes that ontology relates to such fields as theology, library science and artificial intelligence.
  

Further examples of ontological questions include:

• What is existence?
  
• Is existence a property?
  
• Which entities are fundamental?
  
• How do the properties of an object relate to the object itself?
  
• What features are the essential, as opposed to merely accidental, attributes of a given object?
  
• What is a physical object?
  
• Can one give an account of what it means to say that a physical object exists?
  
• Can one give an account of what it means to say that a non-physical entity exists?
  
• What constitutes the identity of an object?
  
• When does an object go out of existence, as opposed to merely changing?
  
• Why does anything exist rather than nothing?

• MAKNA EPISTEMOLOGY

• Epistemology (from Greek ἐπιστήμη - episteme-, "knowledge, science" + λόγος, "logos") or theory of knowledge is the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature and scope (limitations) of knowledge. It addresses the questions:
  

• What is knowledge?
  
• How is knowledge acquired?
  
• What do people know?
  
• How do we know what we know?
  
• Why do we know what we know?

OH TUHAN

Oh Tuhan!
selamatkanlah
ini aku
yang tinggal sejengkal
lagi, masih tegar
menjauhi-Mu

Oh Tuhan!
kasihanilah
ini diri
yang sudah usai
dilupakan aku

Oh Tuhan!
kembalikanlah
ingatkanlah
ini diri
kepada aku

reza

AKU GAGAL MEMAHAMIMU

aku mencari-Mu

lalu menemui aku

aku berlari ke arah-Mu
lalu sampai kepada aku

ternyata aku gagal

untuk memahami-MU...

reza

ENGKAU MASIH DI LANGIT?

aku menangis

menjadikan ruang ini

sebuah lautan

yang mengantarkan aku

ke arah-Mu

tapi, engkau masih di langit?

reza...

CINTA, RINDU DAN AKU

Cinta, Rindu dan Aku

saling bergulat
untuk memenangi
...Dia...

reza.

ON TRUE KNOWLEDGE

IBN 'ARABI On True Knowledge

How can true knowledge be obtained? What do we usually depend on when we want to know things, especially the reality of existence, and what is the role of sense perception and rational consideration? Can the spiritual seeker gain insight by what is generally called independant reasoning?

Shaykh Al-Akbar shows that whatever knowledge is acquired, reason is always bound to follow an authority, for it cannot do otherwise. So what then is the best course to follow,that is which authority can be trusted, if any?

• “The eye is never mistaken, neither it nor any of the senses. . . . The rational faculty perceives in two modes: through an inherent (dhâti) perception in which it is like the senses, never being mistaken; and by a non-inherent perception. The second is what it perceives through its instruments (âla), which are reflection and sense perception.
  
  
• Imagination follows the authority (taqlîd) of that which sense perception gives to it. Reflection considers imagination and finds therein individual things (mufradât). Reflection would love to configure a form to be preserved by the rational faculty. Hence it attributes some of the individual things to others. In this attribution it may be mistaken concerning the actual situation, or it may be correct. Reason judges upon this basis, so it also may be mistaken or correct. Hence reason is a follower of authority, and it may make mistakes. Since the Sufis saw the mistakes of those who employ consideration, they turned to the path in which there is no confusion so that they might take things from the Eye of Certainty (`ayn al-yaqîn) and become qualified by certain knowledge.
  
  
• Reason is full of meddling because reflection governs over it, along with all the faculties within man, since there is nothing greater than reason in following authority. Reason imagines it has God-given proofs, but it only has proofs given by reflection. Reflection's proofs let it take reason wherever it wants, while reason is like a blind man. No, it is even blinder in the path of God. The Folk of Allah do not follow the authority of their reflections, since a created thing should not follow the authority of another created thing. Hence they incline toward following God's authority. They come to know God through God, and He is as He says about Himself, not as meddlesome reason judges.
  
  
• How is it proper for an intelligent man to follow the authority of the reflectivtive faculty, when he divides reflective consideration into correct and corrupt? Necessarily, he has need for a criterion (fâriq) with which to separate the correct from the corrupt, but he cannot possibly distinguish between correct and corrupt reflective consideration through reflective consideration itself. Necessarily, he has need for God in that.
  
  
• As for us, when we want to discern correct reflective consideration from the corrupt so that we may judge by it, we first have recourse to God, asking Him to bestow upon us knowledge of the object without the use of reflection. The Tribe depends upon this and acts in accordance with it. This is the knowledge of the prophets, the friends and the possessors of knowledge among the Folk of Allah. They never transgress their places with their reflective powers.
  
  
• No one can have knowledge unless he knows things through his [its] own essence. Anyone who knows something through something added to his own essence is following the authority of that added thing in what it gives to him. Nothing in existence knows things through its own essence other than the One. The knowledge of things and not-things possessed by everything other than the One is a following of authority. Since it has been established that other than God cannot have knowledge of a thing without following authority, let us follow God's authority, especially in knowledge of Him.
  
  
• Why do we say that nothing can be known by other than God except through following authority? Because man knows nothing except through one of the faculties given to him by God: the senses and reason. Hence man has to follow the authority of his sense perception in that which it gives, and sense perception may be mistaken, or it may correspond to the situation as it is in itself. Or, man has to follow the authority of his rational faculty in that which it gives to him, either the incontrovertible (darûra) or consideration. But reason follows the authority of reflection, some of which is correct and some of which is corrupt, so its knowledge of affairs is by chance (bi'l-ittifâq). Hence there is nothing but following authority.
  
  
• Since this is the situation, the intelligent man who wants to know God should follow His authority in the reports He has given about Himself in His scriptures and upon the tongues of His messengers. When a person wants to know the things, but he cannot know them through what his faculties give him, he should strive in acts of obedience (tâ`ât) until the Real is his hearing, his seeing, and all his faculties [see hadith]. Then he will know all affairs through God and he will know God through God. In any case there is no escape from following authority, but once you know God through God and all things through God, then you will not be visited in that by ignorance, obfucations, doubts or uncertainties. Thus have I alerted you to something which has never before reached your ear!
  
  
• The rational thinkers from among the people of consideration imagine that they know what consideration, sense perception, and reason have bestowed upon them, but they are following the authority of these things. Every faculty is prone to a certain kind of mistake. Though they may know this fact, they seek to throw themselves into error, for they distinguish between that within which sense perception, reason, and reflection may be mistaken and that within which it is not mistaken. But how can they know? Perhaps that which they have declared to be a mistake is correct. Nothing can eliminate this incurable disease, unless all a person's knowledge is known through God, not through other than Him. God knows through His own Essence, not through anything added to It. Hence you also will come to know through that through which He knows, since you follow the authority of Him who knows, who is not ignorant, and who follows the authority of no one. Anyone who follows the authority of other than God follows the authority of him who is visited by mistakes and who is correct only by chance.
  
  
• Someone may object: "How do you know this? Perhaps you may be mistaken in these classifications without being aware of it. For in this you follow the authority of that which can be mistaken: reason and reflection." We reply: You are correct. However, since we see nothing but following authority, we have preferred to follow the authority of him who is named "Messenger" and that which is named "the Speech of God." We followed their authority in knowledge until the Real was our hearing and our sight, so we came to know things through God and gained knowledge of these classifications through God. The fact that we were right to follow this authority was by chance, since, as we have said, whenever reason or any of the faculties accords with something as it is in itself, this is by chance. We do not hold that it is mistaken in every situation. We only say that we do not know how to distinguish its being wrong from its being right. But when the Real is all a person's faculties and he knows things through God, then he knows the difference between the faculties' being right and their being mistaken. This is what we maintain, and no one can deny it, for he finds it in himself.
  
  
• Since this is so, occupy yourself with following that which God has commanded you: practicing obedience to Him, examining (murâqaba) the thoughts that occur to your heart, shame (hayâ) before God, halting before His bounds, being alone (infirâd) with Him, and preferring His side over yourself, until the Real is all your faculties, and you are { upon insight } (Sura 12 verse 108) in your affair.
  
  
• Thus have I counselled you, for we have seen the Real report about Himself that He possesses things which rational proofs and sound reflective powers reject, even though they offer proofs that the report-giver speaks the truth and people must have faith in what he says. So follow the authority of your Lord, since there is no escape from following authority! Do not follow your rational faculty in its interpretation (ta`wil)!
  
• By following the authority of God, the wayfarer thereby passes beyond mere following authority, for then the knowledge he has received through the revealed Law can be "verified" within himself. Thus "verification and realization" (tahqîq) (of what he has learned) completes and perfects following (taqlîd).
  
  
• This Tribe works toward acquiring something of what the divine reports have brought from the Real. They start to polish their hearts through invocations, reciting the Koran, freeing the locus [of God's self-disclosure] from taking possible things into consideration, presence (hudûr), and self-examination (murâqaba). They also keep their outward manifestation pure by halting within the bounds established by the Law, for example by averting the eyes from these things such as private parts which it is forbidden to look upon and by looking at those things which bring about heedfulness and clear seeing [?]. So also with the hearing, tongue, hand, foot, stomach, private parts, and heart.

• Outwardly there are only these seven, and the heart is the eighth. Such a person eliminates reflection from himself completely, since it disperses his singleminded concern (hamm). He secludes himself at the gate of his Lord, occupying himself with examining his heart, in hopes that God will open the gate for him and he will come to know what he did not know, those things which the messengers and the Folk of Allah know and which rational faculties cannot possibly perceive on their own.
  
  
• When God opens the gate to the possessor of this heart, he actualizes a divine self-disclosure which gives to him that which accords with its own properties. Then he attributes to God things which he would not have dared to attribute to God earlier. He would not have described God that way except to the extent that it was brought by the divine reports. He used to take such things through following authority. Now he takes them through unveiling which corresponds with and confirms for him what the revealed scriptures and the messengers have mentioned. He used to ascribe those things to God through faith and as a mere narrator, without verifying their meanings or adding to them. Now he ascribes them to Him within himself, with a verified knowledge because of that which has been disclosed to him.
  
  
• True knowledge cannot be other than unveiled by God to His creature, and this a knowledge without the intermediary of reflection or any other faculty. It is a given, according to the saying, "Knowledge is a light which God throws into the heart of whomsoever He will."
  
  
• Sound knowledge is not given by reflection, nor by what the rational thinkers establish by means of their reflective powers. Sound knowledge is only that which God throws into the heart of the knower. It is a divine light for which God singles out any of His servants whom He will, whether angel, messenger, prophet, friend, or person of faith. He who has no unveiling has no knowledge (man lâ kashf lahu lâ `ilm lahu). (I 218.19)
  
  
• From Chittick's translation and comment on parts of the
  Futuhat al-Makkiyya by Ibn `Arabi:
  "The Sufi Path Of Knowledge -
  Ibn `Arabi's Metaphysics of Imagination"